The Little Rock Confrontation and Cooper v. Aaron: Development and Implementation of Constitutional Litigation by Freyer, Tony A.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 30 Issue 2 Article 10 
2008 
The Little Rock Confrontation and Cooper v. Aaron: Development 
and Implementation of Constitutional Litigation 
Tony A. Freyer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Education Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tony A. Freyer, The Little Rock Confrontation and Cooper v. Aaron: Development and Implementation of 
Constitutional Litigation, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 323 (2008). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss2/10 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
The Little Rock Confrontation and Cooper v. Aaron: Development and 
Implementation of Constitutional Litigation 
Cover Page Footnote 
In September 2007, the city of Little Rock — and the entire country — commemorated a crisis of public 
school integration and race relations that occurred fifty years ago at Central High School in Little Rock, 
Arkansas. The following is one of six essays which are products of the Ben J. Altheimer Symposium on 
the 50th Anniversary of the Central High Crisis, held at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Bowen 
School of Law on September 20 and 21, 2007. Symposium speakers and participants included nationally-
renowned civil rights activists, members of the local judiciary, and local leaders involved both fifty years 
ago and today in working toward equality between all races and ethnicities. 
This essay is available in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/
vol30/iss2/10 
THE LITTLE ROCK CONFRONTATION AND COOPER V. AARON:
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION
Tony A. Freyer "
I. INTRODUCTION
Assessing the legacy of the Little Rock crisis has special relevance to
America's commitment to constitutional government. The struggle over
Central High's racial desegregation reflected the contested constitutional
principles of equality the Declaration of Independence first proclaimed. The
Emancipation Proclamation reaffirmed and the Supreme Court's Brown v.
Board of Education 1954 (1) and 1955 (II) opinions reconstituted these prin-
ciples.' The confrontation in Little Rock during 1956-59 established the
constitutional boundaries within which the Civil Rights Movement and Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr., pursued the spirit of Brown, ultimately defeating the
South's Jim Crow racial apartheid system. The Little Rock crisis thus was a
struggle over constitutional legitimacy whereby one regime began displac-
ing another. Even so, the origins, events and aftermath of the crisis-
including the Supreme Court's first significant enforcement of Brown in
Cooper v. Aaron-suggested how much African American agency has been
essential to attaining equal constitutional guarantees of individual opportuni-
* Tony A. Freyer is University Research Professor of History and Law at the Universi-
ty of Alabama. For support he thanks Law School Dean Kenneth C. Randall, University of
Alabama Law School Foundation, and the Edward Brett Randolph Fund. He is grateful also
for the expert assistance of David Warrington, Harvard Law School Manuscript Division;
Duan van Ee and his colleagues at the Library of Congress Manuscripts Division; and the
staff of the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. At the University of
Alabama School of Law he thanks his secretary, Mrs. Caroline Barge, and, in the Law Li-
brary, Paul Pruitt, Penny Gibson, and Creighton Miller for indispensable research assistance.
1. For my impressionistic comparison of the changing meaning of American "equality"
as it relates to race in these three texts and Little Rock, see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN
AMERICAN MEMORY 15-18, 25-28, 369-80 (2001); TONY A. FREYER, LITTLE ROCK ON TRIAL:
COOPER V. AARON AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (2007); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:
THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATiON AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY (1977); ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 1763-1789 338-39 (2005); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW:
THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1956-1961 168-231 (1994).
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ty and liberty. These were the stakes in developing and implementing civil
rights litigation.2
Journalists Gene Roberts and Hank Klibanoff reported that Little Rock
established the marketable media images to which civil rights stories con-
formed from the mid-1950s through the 1960s. In 1961, historian Daniel
Boorstin explored the technological and business context fostering this mar-
ket for civil rights issues, declaring that "The central paradox-that the rise
of images and of our power over the world blurs rather than sharpens the
outlines of reality-permeates one after another area of our life." Indeed,
there was "hardly a corner of our daily behavior where the multiplication of
images, the products and by-products of the Graphic Revolution, have not
befogged the simplest old everyday distinctions."3 Elsewhere I employ these
insights to argue that the potential and actual use of civil rights media im-
ages gave new contested meaning to the constitutional principles at issue in
the Little Rock struggle. In this paper I suggest the implications of this in-
terpretation for the conflicting rights claims of African Americans and ex-
treme segregationists, Governor Orval Faubus, school officials and other
Arkansas racial moderates, certain federal judges and the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration, the Civil Rights Movement, and their legacy a half-century
later.4
II. LITTLE ROCK NAACP PROTEST LITIGATION AND SEGREGATIONIST
STATES' RIGHTS STRATEGY
Racial discrimination at Little Rock's Central High School during the
1950s symbolized wider inequality. By the mid-twentieth century, Central
High's academic excellence was recognized nationally. That high academic
quality enabled youths from poor, middle-class, and elite white families to
pursue the American dream of improved life opportunities. These same op-
portunities accentuated, however, the profound injustice Arkansas's and the
South's Jim Crow system imposed on African Americans. Little Rock's
2. See generally JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK
M. JOHNSON, JR., AND THE SOUTH'S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS (1993); TAYLOR BRANCH,
PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-1963 (1998); FREYER, supra note
1, at 13-144; DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY
(2004); TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 257-66; JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S
CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965 (1987).
3. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSUEDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA 228-
29 (1961); GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION 143-97 (2007).
4. FREYER, supra note 1.
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Dunbar High was one of very few taxpayer supported black schools in the
entire South possessing enough resources enabling it to meet minimum na-
tional academic standards. No one suggested Dunbar and Central were
equal.5 Indeed, by every objective measure, the South's separate-but-equal
system was deplorably unequal. Moreover, the constitutional law that legi-
timated state police powers implementing this gross discrimination in educa-
tional opportunity also enforced economic inequality in labor, property, and
credit relations. Ultimately, this same constitutional law sanctioned terror-
ism in order to enforce racially discriminatory family and criminal law be-
cause southern courts rarely if ever punished whites for crimes against Afri-
can Americans.6
As a turning point in the struggle for constitutional access to individual
opportunities, the Little Rock crisis thus was significant for African Ameri-
cans. John Kirk, Judith Kilpatrick, myself, and others have corroborated
Georg Iggers's contention that the Little Rock NAACP's switch from sup-
porting to litigation challenging school superintendent Virgil Blossom's
minimalist desegregation plan emerged entirely from local initiative in
1955-56. The New York headquarters of neither the NAACP itself nor the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF) provided significant
assistance until the crisis of September 1957. This local focus indicated,
moreover, that despite setbacks, the Aaron v. Cooper litigation in 1956-57
mobilized working class and poorer African Americans to a new level of
civil rights activism. Wealthier African Americans joined the struggle once
Orval Faubus's defiance created black community solidarity after Septem-
ber 2, 1957. Emphasizing African American agency also revealed the Little
Rock Nine's courage and academic success at Central from the end of the
September crisis on the 25th through Ernest Green's historic graduation in
May 1958, despite relentless harassment from the group of pro-
segregationist white students.
5. See generally DAISY BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF LITTLE ROCK: A MEMOIR 2
(1987); JOHN A. KIRK, REDEFINING THE COLOR LINE: BLACK ACTIVISM IN LITTLE ROCK,
ARKANSAS, 1940-1970 13, 18 (2002); FAUSTINE CHILDRESS JONES, TRADITIONAL MODEL OF
EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE: DUNBAR HIGH SCHOOL OF LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS (1981).
6. See generally supra note 2.
7. See generally Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956), 243 F.2d. 361
(8th Cir. 1957); FREYER, supra note 1, at 13-144; KIRK, supra note 5, at 86-105; Tony A.
Freyer, Objectivity and Involvement: Georg G. Iggers and Writing the History of the Little
Rock School Crisis, in CROSSING BOUNDARIES: THE EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION OF
MINORITIES IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 172-91 (Larry Eugene Jones ed., 2001); G.
G. Iggers, An Arkansas Professor: The NAACP and the Grass Roots, in LITTLE ROCK,
U.S.A.: MATERIALS FOR ANALYSIS 283-332 (W. Record & J. Record eds., 1960); Judith
Kilpatrick, Wiley Austin Branton and Cooper v. Aaron: America Fulfills Its Promise, 65
ARK. HIST. Q. 7-21 (2006).
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African Americans' challenge to Jim Crow's constitutional legitimacy
exposed divisions within the Little Rock white community. Seeking im-
proved opportunity for their children, African American parents persistently
pressed for admission to white schools. Blossom ensured, however, that the
fewest possible African Americans would desegregate these schools, begin-
ning with Central High. Systematically employing purportedly race-neutral
pupil assignment procedures permitted under Brown II, he reduced the num-
ber of African Americans from about 200 to, ultimately, nine. Blossom non-
etheless made a fatal error. He shielded the elite Pulaski Heights families,
rejecting similarly token desegregation of Hall High. This played into the
hands of the violence-prone white Citizens' Council. The Council exploited
not only racist but also social class demagoguery, claiming truly that the
poorer white families living around Central High faced "race mixing" while
the Pulaski Heights "blue-stocking" elite families would attend all-white
Hall High. Switching from moderation to defiance, Faubus employed the
same social-class rhetoric, though he did not also resort to the Citizens'
Council's threatening racist demagoguery.8
Wiley Branton and Daisy Bates led in maneuvering among conflicting
claims of constitutional legitimacy. Branton did the bulk of the pre-trial,
trial, and appellate work in the Aaron v. Cooper litigation, which lasted from
1956-58. Like the relatively few other African American civil rights law-
yers then working across the post-World War II South, Branton routinely
reported to the LDF's New York headquarters any civil rights cases he filed.
Usually, Thurgood Marshall and Assistant Counsel John L. Carter reviewed
such filings and arguments in order to avoid legal or constitutional wrong
turns, but the LDF offered no funding and would not be further involved
unless and until the case was appealed. Indeed, Marshall himself argued the
case only when the school board-ignoring the Little Rock Nine's academic
success, despite ongoing harassment from pro-segregationist students-
appealed to the United States Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron during an
unusual August Special Term in 1958. Beginning in February of that year,
the school board sought a two-and-one-half year delay in the enforcement of
the Little Rock desegregation plan. The issue Marshall litigated before the
Supreme Court was whether, under Brown II, opposition was a permissible
basis for suspending desegregation for thirty months. 9
Daisy Bates presented another image of civil rights activism. Segrega-
tionists boycotted Mr. L. C. and Mrs. Bates's newspaper, the Arkansas State
8. See generally TONY FREYER, THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 92-98 (1984); ELIZABETH JACOWAY, TURN AWAY THY SON: LITTLE ROCK,
THE CRISIS THAT SHOCKED THE NATION 56-59 (2007); KIRK, supra note 5, at 106-08; Graeme
Cope, "Honest White People of the Middle and Lower Classes"?: A Profile of the Capital
Citizens' Council During the Little Rock Crisis of 1957, 61 ARK. HIST. Q. 37-58 (2002).
9. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Kilpatrick, supra note 7, at 7-21.
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Press; state tax authorities harassed them as well. Yet by summer 1957,
Daisy Bates was the public intermediary between nine African American
students and the outside world. Amid accelerating conflict from mid-August
on, Bates effectively employed the media, projecting the students' academic
commitment, courage, and patriotic Cold War Americanism. Martin Luther
King's understanding of the power of the media, gained in the Montgomery
boycott of 1955-56, was consistent with civil rights activist Pauli Murray's
assessment of Daisy Bates's stand with Minnijean Brown, Elizabeth Eck-
ford, Ernest Green, Thelma Mothershed, Melba Pattillo, Gloria Ray, Ter-
rance Roberts, Jefferson Thomas, and Carlotta Walls. The Little Rock
NAACP litigation was an early form of protest that won over African Amer-
icans, as well as northern and international media, to the constitutional rights
claims asserted against Faubus and the segregationists. Thus, Bates
"represents the tough-minded tactical leadership in this struggle," Murray
wrote, "as Martin Luther King represents the moral and spiritual leader-
ship.' °
Pauli Murray's characterization of Bates's leadership suggested how it
popularized conflicting constitutional assumptions. Until Little Rock, Amer-
icans generally perceived constitutional principles like "federalism," "police
powers," "interposition," and even "separate-but-equal" to be vague abstrac-
tions. By contrast, among southerners "states' rights" and the Civil War
were self-identity myths, while the evil of slavery was rationalized away or
ignored. Thus, "states' rights" possessed an intuitive meaning that southern-
ers did not share with non-southerners. For the national and international
media, Bates's "tactical leadership" reduced constitutional abstractions to
the concrete story of nine patriotic African American students courageously
pursuing their education against great odds. The cruel racist intimidation
Elizabeth Eckford experienced-forever captured in Ira Wilmer Counts's
September 4, 1957 photograph--epitomized how the media gave a human
face to the struggle over constitutional rights. Among southerners, however,
those same images aggravated a regional self-identity in which the preserva-
tion of white supremacy depended upon defending states' rights against the
Supreme Court and the federal government, the NAACP, and the northern
and international media."
10. KIRK, supra note 5, at 131. See generally id. at 108-12, 130-32.
11. See generally BLIGHT, supra note 1, at 21, 37, 45, 102-06, 259-61, 343, 388;
BOORSTIN, supra note 3, at 17; HERBERT BROWNELL & JOHN P. BURKE, ADVISING IKE: THE
MEMOIRS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL 155, 190, 264-65 (1993); FREYER,
supra note 8, at 10-12; ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra note 3, at 118-19; Anthony Lewis,
Integration in the U.S.A.: Federalism Faces Test, TIMES OF INDIA, Oct. 1, 1958, at 6; Frances
Lisa Baer, Race Over Rights: The Resistance to Public School Desegregation in Little Rock,
Arkansas, and Beyond, 1954-1960 (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Alabama) (on file with author). Reference to Ira Wilmer Counts's photograph of Elizabeth
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Two articles by legal opinion leaders suggested sexual tensions were
underlying these divergent public images. In 1958, amidst Faubus's third-
term gubernatorial campaign and the Supreme Court's review of Cooper v.
Aaron, Harvard law professor Paul Freund wrote, "It would be idle to look
for a sudden miraculous reconciliation. For one thing, resistance to integra-
tion flows from a deep spring of primitive, subrational fears, summed up by
the frightful 'mongrelization' of the races. To exorcise this image is not the
work of a day or a year." Moreover, in "districts where the Negro populace
exceeds that of whites, the consequence of desegregation is that the white
children in effect will be attending colored schools." Former United States
Supreme Court Justice and South Carolina governor James Byrnes presented
a contrary view: "It is our duty to let the people of other sections know the
attitude of the South is due not to racial prejudice but to the firm belief that
the court has arrogated to itself the power of a third legislature and if not
curbed by Congress, will destroy local governments." Nevertheless, Byrnes
knew, of course, that in their private and public rhetoric segregationists of-
ten advocated states' rights as a surrogate for the racist, often violent, de-
fense of white supremacy.12
While they linked states' rights to Christian teachings purportedly sup-
porting Jim Crow, segregationists differed regarding express appeals to rac-
ism and violence. Arkansas Citizens' Council speakers readily resorted to
crudities such as "a nigger in your school is a potential communist in your
school," and the use of "grass ropes" to enforce racial separation. The
Mothers' League of Central High, however, described itself as "working as
a group of Christian mothers in a Christian-like way. We do not approve of
violence." Both the men and women's segregationist groups nonetheless
agreed that:
If this injustice of the states losing their rights continues, we will be los-
ing everything that has made America a great and Christian nation.
When the will of the people is ignored, then dictatorship sets in ....
[T]he mothers in the league can never accept integration in our hearts
and it has never been the American way of life to sit and have something
forced on us.
They also believed that the pernicious consequences of integration
could include "interracial marriages and the resulting diseases." According-
Eckford and Hazel Bryan is courtesy of the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette and Special Collec-
tions Division, University of Arkansas Libraries.
12. Paul A. Freund, Storm over the American Supreme Court, 21 MOD. L. REv. 345-58
(1958); James F. Byrnes, The Supreme Court and States'Rights, 20 THE ALABAMA LAWYER
396-403 (1959).
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ly, "God himself set us apart by boundaries and language."' 3 These differ-
ences among segregationists separated them from both Little Rock's
NAACP and Faubus.
III. THE ORIGINS OF FAUBUS'S DEFIANCE-COMPLIANCE STRATEGY
Faubus's defiance ranked him among the segregationists, but he dif-
fered from them, particularly regarding interposition. Arkansans knew Fau-
bus to be a quintessential economic liberal, successfully cultivating white
and independent black voters alike. Prior to the crisis Wiley Branton voted
for him. Even during the crisis some independent African Americans voted
for Faubus because he did not resort to racist rhetoric and he distributed
economic-political opportunities more fairly than his predecessors. Up to the
summer of 1957, he rebutted the segregationists' states' rights-interposition
platform with a more moderate version relying upon a pupil assignment law
and providing state legal aid to local school boards challenged by desegrega-
tion suits. Still, Faubus never opposed school desegregation in small Arkan-
sas communities where it had already occurred. He resisted racial desegre-
gation of neither higher education nor public facilities in various Arkansas
cities, including Little Rock. Thus, until the 1957 August turning point,
Faubus's public position towards racial desegregation was that it was a local
not a state matter. As late as July, he publicly committed that "if anyone
expects me to try to use ... [interposition laws] to supersede federal laws
they are wrong." 4
Although a third-term gubernatorial reelection bid clearly motivated
Faubus, the political calculus was complex, especially involving interposi-
tion. Biographer Roy Reed quotes Faubus frankly telling a few supporters in
1954 that should he discover the means to exploit racial conflict, "they'll
never get me out of office." During the intervening years before the crisis,
Faubus adhered to the local control inherent in the "with all deliberate
speed" standard of Brown H to outmaneuver segregationist extremist James
Johnson's more radical interposition program. But amidst the growing ten-
sion of August 1957, Reed also reports that Daisy Bates believed Faubus
was a follower rather than an instigator of political pressures unleashed by
school officials and the Little Rock Pulaski Heights elite, which, in turn,
13. Graeme Cope, "A Thorn in the Side"? The Mothers' League of Central High School
and the Little Rock Desegregation Crisis of 1957, 57 ARK. HIST. Q. 160-90, as quoted 167,
169, 170 (1998); see also FREYER, supra note 8, at 65; David L. Chappell, Diversity Within a
Racial Group: White People in Little Rock, 1957-1959, 66 ARK. HIST. Q. 181-93 (2007).
14. RoY REED, FAUBUS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AN AMERICAN PRODIGAL 188 (1997);
see also FREYER, supra note 8, at 74-98; JACOWAY, supra note 8, at 106-29. I thank Profes-
sor Judith Kilpatrick for the reference to Wiley Branton's vote for Faubus, confirmed in
interview by Tony Freyer with Wiley Branton, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 3, 1980).
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aggravated poorer white's racial as well as social class antagonisms. As the
segregationists insisted, because of the Blossom plan blue-collar and middle
class families living around Central High faced "race-mixing," whereas the
elite families sending their children to Hall High did not. Thus, Daisy Bates
told her friend, white lawyer Edwin E. Dunaway, concerning Faubus, "He's
against you and the people in the Heights and I'm going to have to pay for
it . ,15
Given these political imperatives, Faubus used states' rights to distin-
guish himself from both segregationist extremists, like Johnson, and federal
authority. During the 1956 gubernatorial campaign, east Arkansas lawyer R.
B. McCulloch fashioned the moderate interposition platform Faubus em-
ployed to counter Johnson's more radical states' rights program. McCulloch
knew that federal litigation challenging his own or Johnson's interposition
measures faced protracted legal proceedings lasting years before the federal
courts would likely declare such measures to be unconstitutional. Mean-
while, segregationist extremists and moderates alike could claim that federal
supremacy remained in doubt, engendering among the mass of white Arkan-
sas citizens hopeful political support for resistance. What Faubus understood
that Johnson did not, however, was that many Arkansas citizens were racial
moderates who, while favoring racial segregation, also resisted the tendency
towards violence associated with Johnson's brand of interposition. McCul-
loch shaped his interposition platform to sentiments held by his fellow mod-
erate segregationists in east Arkansas, where the poor black majority was
dependent upon white planters for employment and credit. 6
These interposition politics shaped Faubus's actions during the August
1957 clandestine maneuvers among white leaders. Blossom and school
board members publicly expressed confidence that Central High's desegre-
gation would proceed in an orderly fashion. Privately, however, the segrega-
tionists' covert threats and aggressive public rhetoric aroused Blossom's
profound fears that trouble was imminent. Among various other private in-
itiatives, Judge Miller privately informed a school board member of his wil-
lingness to grant a delay in the implementation of his own desegregation
order until the constitutionality of interposition measures was decided,
which he undoubtedly knew would take time. Thus, in an August 13 private
meeting, Miller focused not upon the possible outcome of a public adver-
sarial process in which school board and LDF lawyers presented evidence
addressing a formal legal question. Instead, to a school board member, the
representative of one of the parties upon whom his order was binding, Miller
15. REED, supra note 14, at 169, 205; see also FREYER, supra note 8, at 74-98;
JACOWAY, supra note 8, at 106-29.
16. FREYER, supra note 8, at 34-35, 77, 80, 89, 128, 129; REED, supra note 14, at 189;
Baer, supra note 11, at 35-100.
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directly acknowledged a preference for granting a delay favoring the school
board. Although school officials eventually dropped the idea, they did so
only after privately suggesting to Faubus that such proceedings could delay
the desegregation of Central High. 7
Much research has demonstrated how such private exchanges con-
verged with the segregationists' public actions to shape Faubus's claim in
the Thomason suit that violence was imminent should desegregation proceed
on September 3. Although this scholarship reveals no hard evidence sup-
porting Faubus, the local court ordered desegregation halted. Visiting feder-
al judge Ronald N. Davies overruled the state court as a result of petitions
from school board and LDF lawyers on April 30. Davies enjoined anyone
from interfering with Central High's racial desegregation. Insisting that dis-
order was imminent, Faubus nonetheless issued a proclamation on Septem-
ber 2 ordering the Arkansas National Guard to prevent African American
students from entering Central High. At that time and subsequently, Fau-
bus's motivations seemed driven by the third-term reelection bid. Still, sev-
eral works noted, the political calculus was, as Faubus himself admitted,
murky. Deserving of emphasis was, however, the constitutional rational
supporting Faubus's proclamation and the terms his lawyer-advisor, William
J. Smith, used to justify it. What was Smith's private assessment of Faubus's
claim that in order to prevent impending violence he dispatched the Guard
to prevent desegregation at Central High?
8
Answering this question indicates that Faubus sought to delay Central
High's desegregation and thereby to shift upon others the responsibility for
enforcement. Reflecting a formally correct reading of United States consti-
tutional law prescribing state authorities' duty under police powers to sup-
press possible unlawful acts, Smith advised Faubus that he should act only
after enforcing the African American students' rights resulted in disorder.
Otherwise, absent strong evidence vindicating Faubus's belief that violence
was imminent, the federal court would certainly declare his action to be il-
legal. Smith's advice was consistent, too, with the provision in Brown II,
which Miller's decision in Aaron v. Cooper affirmed, that opposition to de-
segregation was not a lawful basis for state officials' refusal to enforce a
desegregation order. As a result of Smith's professional advice, then, Faubus
knew that in response to the guard's obstruction of the federal desegregation
order, the federal court would demand from him unequivocal evidence sup-
porting his professed concerns about impending violence. As he had shown
in the Thomason proceedings, Faubus was unable to meet that high standard
17. FREYER, supra note 8, at 99-100; JACOWAY, supra note 8, at 90; REED, supra note
14, at 193-96.
18. FREYER, supra note 8, at 98-114; JACOWAY, supra note 8, at 84-103, 106-29; KIRK,
supra note 5, at 112-29; REED, supra note 14, at 193-223.
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of proof. But according to this reading, Faubus saw political advantage in
the lack of evidence.19
Based on Smith's advice, Faubus could not have doubted that the fed-
eral court would hold that his use of the guard was unlawful and, therefore,
that enforcement of desegregation should proceed. Moreover, Faubus prob-
ably perceived that the surest political gains were to be achieved by defying
and then complying with the federal court order. Why? First, because he
could take political credit for following the segregationists' states' rights-
interposition ideology; second, by doing so he could claim the pure motive
of seeking to avoid violence, but at the same time create an atmosphere in
which enforcement of desegregation would engender probable if not inevit-
able disorder. Furthermore, the legal and symbolic moral duty of addressing
such disorder would lie--clearly not with Faubus, who could assert he had
done his best and been rebuffed-but with either the federal government or
school officials. Finally, these legalistic and constitutional imperatives
enabled Faubus to avoid the inflammatory public racism that even led many
segregationist-minded Arkansans such as McCulloch to shun extremists like
Johnson, thereby casting Faubus as being comparatively moderate within
state politics.E°
These political imperatives informed Smith's drafting of Faubus's Sep-
tember 2 proclamation igniting the crisis. Contemporary and later commen-
tators focused upon Faubus's weak evidence justifying his expressed fear of
impending violence. Receiving less public attention was Smith's charge that
Judge Davies's orders prevented a legal test of the interposition laws. As a
result, "one of the greatest reasons for unrest and for the imminence of dis-
order and violence," Faubus declared, was public doubt about whether the
Supreme Court desegregation decisions or the states' rights-interposition
measures were supreme. Until this uncertainty was resolved, those state
laws bound him as governor. Smith's lawyerly expertise explained the legal
dimensions of the proclamation, crafted in preparation for inevitable chal-
lenges to be raised by LDF lawyers on behalf of the African American stu-
dents' constitutional rights claims, as well as those involving school board
officials' duty. Faubus contended that preserving segregation by military
force was necessary until a "proper authority" settled the question of consti-
tutional supremacy. This compliance-defiance strategy violated the Brown II
principle: faced with resistance state officials should enforce, not oppose,
constitutional rights."'
19. FREYER, supra note 8, at 115-37; interview by Tony Freyer with William J. Smith,
in Little Rock, Ark. (Sept. 3, 1980).
20. This paragraph states the author's conclusion based on a reading of the evidence
above; my argument is consistent with Baer, supra note 11, at 100-202.
21. See generally supra note 18, 19.
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IV. THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION COLD WAR IMPERATIVE AND
OBSCURE CONTINGENCIES
The initial Aaron v. Cooper litigation, the Little Rock crisis itself, and
the 1958-59 phase of struggle converged with national Cold War politics.
The litigation arose in Faubus's second-term reelection campaign touting a
compromised version of the segregationists' states' rights-interposition plat-
form during 1956-57. In this period the South's congressional delegation
joined with conservative Republicans supporting bills attacking the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction over civil rights and Cold War civil liberties cases. The
conservative coalition defeated Title III of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. Title
III would have expanded federal authority over civil rights litigation. With-
out President Dwight Eisenhower's support, the provision died; he signed
the weakened law during the September 1957 crisis. Other assaults the con-
servative coalition mounted against the federal judiciary's jurisdiction were
defeated narrowly in 1957-58. Overall, however, such attacks isolated the
Supreme Court as the agent of desegregation, while the South's "massive
resistance" campaign accelerated following the 1956 Southern Manifesto. In
line with Byrnes's contention, the southern congressional delegation quieted
racial appeals to conservative Republicans, emphasizing instead states'
rights and communism.22
Little Rock African Americans' struggle against segregationist de-
fiance thus succeeded gradually. The local NAACP's Aaron v. Cooper liti-
gation mobilized poorer African Americans, despite the School Board's
federal trial and appellate court triumphs in August 1956 and April 1957.
Wealthier African Americans gave the local NAACP support as a result of
the crisis during August 30 to September 25. Although extraordinary public
events held popular attention, complex clandestine contacts among (1)
school officials, Judge Miller, federal authorities, and Faubus on the one
hand, and (2) Faubus and Citizens' Council leaders on the other hand during
the fateful summer of 1957 shaped the crisis and its outcome.23 Consistent
with these obscure events was the federal government's failure to offer into
22. See generally THOMAS BORSTELMANN, THE COLD WAR AND THE COLOR LINE:
AMERICAN RACE RELATIONS IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 100-02 (2001); BROWNELL & BURKE,
supra note 11, at 150, 187, 202, 204, 214, 218-26, 227, 301, 354; MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD
WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000); KLARMAN,
supra note 2, at 366; LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 99-
102 (2002); TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 306-07; Judith Kilpatrick, Wiley Austin Branton and
the Voting Rights Struggle, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 642-701 (2004); Azza Salama
Layton, International Pressure and the U.S. Government's Response to Little Rock, 66 ARK.
HIST. QUARTERLY 243-57 (2007); Willaim G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State
Officials: A Case Study of Why Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 483-612
(2002); Baer, supra note 11, at 203-45.
23. See generally supra note 18.
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evidence at the September 20 trial the FBI Report refuting Faubus's conten-
tion that violence had been imminent on September 3. At trial Davies de-
cided against Faubus. The governor then withdrew the Guard, creating a
vacuum in authority filled by the "Battle of Central High" on September 23-
25 that Eisenhower ended by ordering the 101st Airborne to Little Rock.
Still, Faubus turned the Justice Department's failure to use the report to de-
24magogic purposes.
The government's reasons for not using the FBI Report remained ob-
scure, but unwillingness to expose Judge Miller's conduct may have been a
factor. Amidst the turmoil of September 3-5 Judge Davies ordered the FBI
to investigate all leads that could prove or disprove Faubus's rationale that
impending violence justified his deployment of the Guard at Central High.
Davies granted Faubus the September 20 trial to offer his own evidence on
the issue; lacking convincing evidence, his lawyers, after preliminary ma-
ters, simply walked out of court. Before the trial the FBI had delivered to
Davies the 500-plus page report. As a result, Davies learned of Miller's con-
fidential exchanges with school officials during August regarding a possible
delay in enforcing the desegregation order, pending a court test of the inter-
position laws. "I did not have any idea of Judge Miller's involvement until
reading the FBI Report. I consider Judge Miller's actions, as set out in the
report, if true, to be wholly inappropriate and unbecoming a federal judge,"
he later informed the present author. After weeks of confrontation preceding
the September 20 trial, the Justice Department thus may have withheld the
FBI Report to avoid inflaming the situation further by publicizing Judge
Miller's behavior.
Davies also realized how much his presence in Little Rock enhanced
Faubus's demagoguery. Although Davies was chosen randomly to handle a
backlog of cases, the selection became necessary because Miller confiden-
tially had requested to be removed from the Aaron v. Cooper litigation dur-
ing the Thomason case. A North Dakota Republican and devout Catholic,
Davies inevitably clashed with Arkansas Democratic politics, southern ra-
cial mores, and Protestant culture. Thus, though in fact routine, Davies's
appointment enabled Faubus to assert that the judge's appearance in Little
Rock resulted from a conspiracy. Miller's abandonment of the desegregation
litigation at the point of Faubus's emerging defiance--combined with the
ethics problem--convinced Davies that Arkansans were being exploited by
their own leaders. These considerations only strengthened Davies's resolve
24. FREYER, supra note 8, at 118-28; KIRK, supra note 5, at 118; REED, supra note 14, at
222.
25. FREYER, supra note 8, at 101-07, 122-25, 134. For Judge Davies's comment on
Judge Miller's conduct, see memorandum from Ronald N. Davies, Sr., United States District
Court Judge for the District of North Dakota, to Tony Freyer (Mar. 1980) (on file with au-
thor).
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that as the presiding judge he would address the momentous issues at stake
in the crisis according to the strictest regard for the law and the Constitution.
Having done his duty, Davies departed Little Rock not long after the crisis.
The school board then decided to seek the thirty month delay, relieved that
the case was in the hands of a "southern" federal judge, Arkansan Harry
Lemley.26
Eisenhower's vacillation before and during the crisis contrasted sharply
with Judge Davies's decisiveness. Eisenhower's lack of support for making
Title III part of the 1957 Civil Rights Act suggested the President's well-
known dislike of and refusal to provide moral support for either the Brown
decision or the Supreme Court. During the crisis Faubus exploited Eisen-
hower's willingness to allow the governor an "orderly retreat." Such senti-
ments were consistent with Justice Department officials' confidential sug-
gestion to Branton that he agree to delay Central High's desegregation-a
suggestion Branton of course refused. Nevertheless, after weeks of public
and private negotiations confirmed that Faubus sought only narrow political
advantage, Eisenhower on September 24 and 25 asserted executive leader-
ship, dispatching the 101st Airborne to quell the riot outside Central High,
and thereby to enforce Judge Davies's desegregation order.27 In an Execu-
tive Order, Eisenhower explained that the Supreme Court's holding in
Brown that "compulsory segregation laws are unconstitutional" was fol-
lowed on the basis of "gradual progress" in certain "southern states"-but
regretfully not Arkansas-showing the "world that we are a nation in which
laws, not men, are supreme. 28
Notwithstanding the Brown reference, Eisenhower offered other justifi-
cations for sending troops to Little Rock. All United States citizens' "indi-
vidual rights and freedoms rest[ed] upon the certainty that the President and
the Executive branch of the Government will ... insure the carrying out of
the decisions of the federal courts .... Mob rule cannot be allowed to over-
ride the decisions of our courts." Even so, the "proper use of the powers of
the Executive Branch to enforce the orders of a federal court is limited to
extraordinary and compelling circumstances. Manifestly, such an extreme
situation has been created in Little Rock." Pointedly describing the Cold
War danger, Eisenhower then declared, "We face grave situations abroad
because of the hatred that communism bears toward a system of government
based on human rights." Thus, "it would be difficult to exaggerate the harm
that is being done to the prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of
26. Id.; see also generally Cooper v. Aaron, 1 U.S. 358 (1958).
27. See supra note 22, 24.
28. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President Eisenhower's Address on the Situation in Little
Rock, September 24, 1957, in no. 198 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (1957).
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our nation and the world." Moreover, he warned, "Our enemies are gloating
over this incident and using it everywhere to misrepresent our whole nation.
We are portrayed as a violator of those standards" of "human rights" the
"peoples of the world united to proclaim in the Charter of the United Na-
tions.""
National surveys revealed that northerners and southerners diverged
regarding Eisenhower's rationales. The Trendex organization publicized
telephone surveys on September 26. Of 1,000 respondents, 68.4 percent
favored Eisenhower ordering United States Army units to Little Rock. Re-
moving southern respondents, the positive supporters rose to 77.5 percent.
In the South alone, the surveys revealed, 62.6 percent opposed Eisenhower's
order; just 33.9 percent supported it and 3.5 percent had no opinion. A Gal-
lup poll of national opinion gave Eisenhower's actions almost two-thirds
support, whereas 53 percent of southerners opposed them. The President's
broad support among a majority of Americans responding to the surveys
was consistent with his firmly expressed executive duty to enforce federal
court orders, especially given the harm Arkansas officials' defiance did na-
tional security in the propaganda battle against communist enemies.3° The
pro-western foreign press also generally favored the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration. Thus, national and international opinion suggested that preserving
the African American students' constitutional rights was a necessary condi-
tion for maintaining federal supremacy over demagogic state and local de-
fiance. But southerners associated Little Rock's federal "occupation" with
authoritarianism.3
From the September crisis to the summer of 1959, the national offices
of the NAACP and the LDF supported Mr. and Mrs. Bates and the nine stu-
dents. During the Supreme Court's 1958 August Special Term, Thurgood
Marshall argued for and won Cooper v. Aaron. Professor Lee Lorch and his
wife Grace were, by contrast, casualties of the national NAACP's new lea-
dership role in Little Rock. Respected and active members of the local
NAACP since the beginning of the desegregation suit, Lee conducted a tu-
torial program for the Little Rock nine while they were excluded from class
during the crisis. The program helped the nine to do well when they finally
entered Central High. Grace assisted Elizabeth Eckford during her Septem-
ber 4 ordeal. But notwithstanding his acquittal in federal court regarding
charges of communist affiliation, Lorch's identification with radicalism re-
29. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President Eisenhower's Address on the Situation in Little
Rock, September 24, 1957, in no. 198 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (1957).
30. Carroll P. Newton to Sherman Adams, Sept. 26, 1957, White House Office Files,
Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries (Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library); George
H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1953-1971 (1972), at 1517, vol. 2.
31. See generally supra note 22.
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ceived publicity. Grace also came under suspicion. Accordingly, concerned
about preserving the nine students and the NAACP's own patriotic, staunch
anti-communist image, national NAACP officials forced Lorch's resignation
from the local organization and departure to Canada. During the year of
Little Rock's closed schools, 1958-59, it seemed that segregationist de-
fiance had prevailed."
By mid-1959, however, racial segregation encountered defeat on sever-
al fronts. Little Rock moderates and the Pulaski Heights business elite final-
ly took a firm public stand against Faubus and the segregationists. In the
wake of Faubus's defiance of the Supreme Court's Cooper v. Aaron deci-
sion of September 29, 1958, the segregationist-controlled school board at-
tempted but failed to fund private schools with public money. Stymied, the
segregationist board fired many dedicated teachers, claiming they were de-
segregation sympathizers. Discreetly aided by the Women's Emergency
Committee, the business elite responded at last by calling a special election;
along with black voters, the moderates narrowly won in May 1959. The
newly constituted school board, learning from Blossom's mistake, brought
token desegregation to both Central and Hall High Schools in August 1959
without significant resistance. The close victory indicated that the Supreme
Court's Cooper v. Aaron decision had limited the moderates' and segrega-
tionists' options, forcing the political settlement. During the summer of
1959, the federal court finally declared segregationists' states' rights meas-
ures unconstitutional. Faubus was critical but did nothing. The Little Rock
confrontation was over.33
V. LITTLE ROCK'S LEGACY OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVISM
Although the Little Rock NAACP initiated Aaron v. Cooper on its
own, the litigation reflected King's emerging protest strategy. During the
first half of 1957, as Branton appealed and lost this initial phase of the case,
a group of Christian ministers, identified with King and sparked by the
Montgomery bus boycott, consolidated organizational efforts into the new
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). NAACP leader Roy
Wilkins asserted that his organization "does wish to cooperate with the mi-
nister group." He nonetheless stated that "the particular form of direct action
used in Montgomery was effective only for certain kinds of local problems
and could not be applied safely on the national scale." King, by contrast,
supported both effective civil rights legislation and federal litigation culmi-
32. See supra note 22; see also FREYER, supra note 1, at 135-211; interview by Tony
Freyer with Lee Lorch, in Toronto, Canada (June 10, 2006).
33. FREYER, supra note 8, at 128-63; JACOWAY, supra note 8, at 183-348; Baer, supra
note 11, at 203-45.
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nating in cases such as Brown L He resisted, however, dissipating valuable
resources through litigation in state court, especially given those courts'
general presumption that whites would rarely if ever be convicted for illegal
conduct against African Americans. Thus, King wrote, African Americans
"[m]ust not get involved in legalism [and] needless fights in lower courts,"
which was "exactly what the white man wants the Negro to do. Then he can
draw out the fight.
34
Civil rights litigation in Little Rock vindicated part of King's emerging
strategy. Given the futility of state court litigation, he declared, "Our job
now is implementation .... We must move on to mass action. . . in every
community in the South, keeping in mind that civil disobedience to local
laws is civil obedience to national laws., 35 By mid-August 1957, the pastor
of the First Baptist Church of Little Rock, Rev. Roland S. Smith, led ten
African American ministers in filing a federal lawsuit testing the constitu-
tionality of the interposition laws the Arkansas legislature had enacted earli-
er in 1957. Supported by the local NAACP and LDF lawyers, the suit tar-
geted segregationist extremists' assertions that state police powers enabled
state authorities to block the enforcement of federal court orders mandating
desegregation. The case bogged down, seemingly vindicating King's predic-
tion about pernicious "legalism." Nevertheless, the litigation, like Aaron v.
Cooper itself, fostered unity within the Little Rock African American com-
munity. Thus, although these cases became entangled in delay and even
experienced initial defeat, thereby suggesting inconsistency with King's
mass action, ultimately they encouraged African American community soli-
darity that such action required.36
King grasped the significance of Little Rock for the emerging nonvio-
lent protest campaign. He attended Ernest Green's historic graduation from
Central High in May 1958. In 1959, although northern whites were receptive
to Eisenhower's shifting position towards Brown and the Supreme Court,
King stated that "much of the tension in the South and many of the reverses
we are now facing could have been avoided if President Eisenhower had
taken a strong, positive stand on the question of civil rights and the Supreme
Court's [Brown] decision as soon as it was rendered." As a result, Faubus's
"irresponsible actions brought the [civil rights] issue to [the] forefront of the
conscience of the nation" and, unlike Eisenhower's vacillation, "allowed
people to see the futility of attempting to close the public schools."37 As
early as the Montgomery bus boycott, echoing Pauli Murray's assessment of
34. See generally supra note 7; GARROW, supra note 2, at 91-92.
35. GARROW, supra note 2, at 91-92.
36. Id.; see also Smith v. Faubus, 230 Ark. 831, 327 S.W.2d 562 (1959); 2 RACE REL. L.
REP. 1103 (1957); Baer, supra note 11, at 143.
37. GARRow, supra note 2, at 119; JACOWAY, supra note 8, at 249.
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Daisy Bates's tactical leadership, King distinguished federal and state judi-
cial action, saying as follows:
Our local [Alabama] judges, it seems succumb to the whims and caprices
of local custom in deciding cases like ours. In the federal courts, a judge
is appointed and doesn't have to worry about being reelected. God grant
them the moral courage and integrity to interpret the Constitution in its
true meaning.
38
Cooper v. Aaron revealed, however, the difficulties inherent in the "de-
liberate speed" standard of Brown I. Thurgood Marshall's construction of
this standard was accepted by the Court in Cooper, holding that state and
local officials facing opposition like that occurring in Little Rock should
enforce rights claims rather than surrender to defiance. In their closed deli-
berations during the 1958 August Special Term, the members of the Court
nonetheless disagreed over the limits of discretion Brown H permitted feder-
al judges enforcing the standard. Supported by Justices Hugo L. Black and
William 0. Douglas, Justice William J. Brennan drafted an opinion curbing
local federal judges' discretion in applying "deliberate speed." Had Brennan
prevailed, it would have limited federal judges in the future from using dis-
cretion like that employed by Judge Miller to easily reject the local
NAACP's initial suit in 1956, as well as the incentive for his problematic
conduct contributing to the crisis in August 1957. Nevertheless, a majority
of the Court led by Justices John M. Harlan and Felix Frankfurter rejected
Brennan's attempt, asserting instead the Court's expansive judicial supre-
macy that LDF lawyers eventually used to establish "synergy" between LDF
litigation and non-violent protest.
39
Admittedly, this "synergy" occurred episodically. New York NAACP
leaders and even Thurgood Marshall disagreed with King initially regarding
the practice. Following the holding in Cooper v. Aaron that opposition could
never justify public officials' refusal to enforce Brown, however, LDF law-
yers and civil rights protestors increasingly cooperated. This was especially
so after local officials in Albany, Georgia, outmaneuvered King in 1961,
employing tactics reminiscent of Faubus's manipulation of police powers in
38. BASS, supra note 2, at 109; KIRK, supra note 5, at 131-32.
39. Papers of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Part I Case Files, Cooper v. Aaron, August
Special Term (1958), No. 58-1, Box 14-15 (Library of Congress, Manuscripts [hereinafter
LC]); papers of Justice John M. Harlan, Cooper v. Aaron (1958), Box 57 (Seeley G. Mudd
Manuscript Library, Princeton University); papers of Justi.,e Hugo L. Black, Case File No. 1,
Cooper v. Aaron, August Special Term (1958), Container 335 (LC); papers of Justice Felix
Frankfurter, Cooper v. Aaron (1958), File 4052, Box 220 (LC); papers of Felix Frankfurter,
Cooper v. Aaron (1958), Microfilm Reels 35, 36 (Harvard Law School Manuscripts). These
papers are the basis for FREYER, supra note 1, at 135-201. For "synergy," see MICHAEL
MELTSNER, THE MAKING OF A CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 91 (2006).
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Little Rock. "Because of Dr. King's initial belief that the federal govern-
ment was sure to intervene," wrote former LDF lawyer Michael Meltsner,
"little effort was put into attempts to challenge the machinations of Albany
city fathers by pressuring them in court. It was a mistake that King and his
southern allies would largely succeed in avoiding thereafter, and this solidi-
fied his future relationship with the LDF." As George Wallace replaced
Faubus as the symbol of states' rights defiance, King and his followers
combined passive resistance with judicial vindication of constitutional rights
claims that the LDF won from a few federal judges like Alabama's Frank
Johnson, federal appellate courts, and the Supreme Court.n°
The Freedom Riders during 1961 promoted opposing images of civil
rights protest and southern defiance, as had occurred in Little Rock. The Ku
Klux Klan's and others' bloody assault on the Freedom Riders in Alabama
produced the court order from Judge Frank Johnson that helped to mobilize
federal-state cooperation to preserve order. Johnson responded to further
defiance, however, with an even broader court order threatening all parties
with imprisonment if resistance continued. Through Alabama and Missis-
sippi to New Orleans, the African American and white protestors held out
signs from bus windows exclaiming such messages as: "Take a Stand for the
Law of the Land," "Enforce the Constitution 13th, 14th, 15th Amendments,"
"Freedom's Wheels Are Rolling," and "The Law of the Land Is Our De-
mand." Along the same route United States Nazi Party storm troopers dis-
played on a van slogans exclaiming: "We Do Hate Race Mixing" and "Lin-
coln Rockwell's HATE BUS." Amidst such clashing messages, especially
given the 1961 Cold War environment, the Freedom Riders' obedience to
Frank Johnson's order reinforced a public impression of the moral and con-
stitutional high ground against violence-prone destroyers of true American
freedom.4
The combined litigation and non-violent protests thus challenged the
constitutional underpinnings of "southern massive resistance" and ultimately
won. At the same time, states' rights and surrogate racist images resonating
among southerners enabled Faubus, Wallace, and many others to shift to
federal authorities not only legal and political responsibility, but also blame,
for implementing desegregation polices. To a greater or lesser extent these
leaders repeated the defiance-compliance strategy Faubus pioneered in Little
Rock. Sometimes public officials overplayed their hand, such as Bull Con-
ner's deployment of fire hoses and police dogs in Birmingham from May 2-
7, 1963, against peacefully demonstrating African American children, or
Dallas County sheriff Jim Clark's attack on upon peaceful marchers at Ed-
40. MELTSNER, supra note 39, at 34, 43-44, 84-91, as quoted at 87.
41. RAYMOND ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS: 1961 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 93-303, as quoted at 277, 294 (2006).
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mund Pettus Bridge in Selma on "Bloody Sunday," March 7, 1965. In such
instances, the leader's error was not only the brutality itself, but that he car-
ried it out before media that transmitted the images across America and
around the world. These public images of lawless lawmen merged, moreo-
ver, with the bombers' killing of four African American girls in Sunday
school on September 15, 1963, at the 16th Street Baptist Church in Bir-
mingham.42
The Little Rock confrontation presaged the civil rights movement her-
itage of hope and continuing struggle. King's 1963 "Letter from a Birming-
ham Jail" noted the integral connection between federal litigation and non-
violent protest. "I can urge men to obey the 1954 decision of the Supreme
Court because it is morally right, and I can urge them to disobey segregation
ordinances because they are morally wrong," he said. Furthermore, "as fed-
eral courts have consistently affirmed ... it is immoral to urge an individual
to withdraw his efforts to gain his constitutional rights because the quest
precipitates violence. Society must protect the robbed and punish the rob-
ber." Although disappointed in Judge Frank Johnson's initial order against
the Selma march, King shaped his protest strategy around the ultimately
prescient hope that the federal judge would eventually order the voting
rights marchers to proceed under federal protection. The Little Rock
NAACP's decision to sue in 1955 thus evidenced a struggle culminating in
Congress enacting the revolutionary Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965, overturning Jim Crow and establishing the basis for
continuing federal intervention in state and local affairs in defense of consti-
tutional rights.43
VI. CONCLUSION
Fifty years after the 1957 confrontation, a federal court has ended its
oversight of Little Rock schools. An African American majority school
board faces equitable funding problems, white families' "flight" to private
or suburban public schools, and a large gap in standardized test scores be-
tween whites and the school district's 70 percent African American students.
The roughly 52 percent minority population of Central High suggests, how-
ever, alternative considerations. Central High remains ranked among the
nation's best public high schools; regularly, African American students'
academic excellence contributes to that ranking. Moreover, Central is the
nation's first and, as of 2007, only operating high school that is also a histor-
42. BASS, supra note 2, at 248; BORSTELMANN, supra note 22, at 160-61, 188-91;
MELTSNER, supra note 39, at 60, 63, 122-23, 91, 108-09.
43. GARROW, supra note 2, at 268-69, 313-30, 380-407; MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.,
Letter from [a] Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 85, 89 (1964); see also generally
supra note 34.
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ic site run by the United States Park Service. In practical as well as symbolic
terms, today's African American students at Central share at least one expe-
rience with the Little Rock Nine: though comparatively few, Central's
present African American students pursue individual opportunity amidst
wider inequality beyond Central. Even so, the Nine's most conspicuous leg-
acy is that their African American successors attend Central High free from
the omnipresent discrimination and fear imposed by the Jim Crow racial
apartheid system.'
What does the Little Rock Nine's courageous triumph over this oppres-
sive system suggest regarding America's ongoing struggle to attain the ideal
of equality? First, as Georg Iggers long ago demonstrated, the Nine's strug-
gle arose from the local NAACP's decision to challenge the Little Rock
School Board's calculated choice of a desegregation plan permitting the
most minimal compliance with Brown II. This plan allowed only the fewest
possible African Americans into the city's white school system. Focusing on
the Little Rock NAACP, Daisy Bates, and Wiley Branton indicated, moreo-
ver, that only local African Americans actively pursued the maximum edu-
cational opportunity consistent with both Brown opinions. An unintended
consequence of the September 1957 crisis was that Little Rock's white
moderates established their minimalist desegregation plan as the basis for
enforcing the Brown II standard of "with all deliberate speed" against "mas-
sive resistance." Thus, the constitutional confrontation of Faubus's com-
pliance-defiance strategy delayed, Judge Miller's problematic behavior
complicated, and segregationist violence aggravated the local NAACP's
original goal of attaining truly equal educational opportunity for Little
Rock's African American families.
Second, among white supporters of minimal desegregation, enforcing
equal educational opportunity was subordinate to other goals. Little Rock
moderates remained consistent during and after the September crisis, in the
1958 appeal for a thirty-month delay and in the spring 1959 campaign to
reopen Little Rock's schools, stating that they countenanced desegregation
only out of pragmatic obedience to Supreme Court authority. The new mod-
erate school board's willingness in 1959 to bring minimal desegregation to
Central and Hall High suggested both the limited options Cooper v. Aaron
imposed, as well as a practical unwillingness to repeat the Blossom Plan's
mistaken favoritism towards Pulaski Heights. Even though the Supreme
44. Andrew DeMillo, Little Rock Schools Freed From Court, WASHINGTON POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/24/AR2007022400237.html.
The reference to Little Rock Central High School as a unique Historic Site is based on the
author's observation. On "white fight" from Little Rock School District and other ongoing
resistance to integration, see Tony A. Freyer, Enforcing Brown in the Little Rock Crisis, 6 J.
App. PRAc. & PROCESS 67-78 (2004) and Ben F. Johnson, III, After 1957: Resisting Integra-
tion in Little Rock, 66 ARK. HIST. Q. 258-83 (2007).
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Court's Cooper decision impelled those limits by forcefully affirming judi-
cial supremacy, it did so because the majority refused to accept Justice
Brennan's attempt-supported only by Black and Douglas-to restrict fed-
eral judicial discretion inherent in the "deliberate speed" standard. Eisen-
hower's strict regard for federalism, heightened by Cold War necessity, ex-
plained his vacillation before, during, and after the crisis. Over the same
period, Congress could not escape the conservative coalition's obstruction-
ism.
The Little Rock confrontation thus instituted images of triumph and
conditional constitutional rights. Daisy Bates's "tactical" use of the student-
centered media imagery personalized constitutional rights within a Cold
War context, winning over the national media, northern voters, and federal
elected officials. Eisenhower's dispatch of paratroopers and the Supreme
Court's historic August Special Term-both targeting enforcement of those
rights claims-solidified the media imagery Bates and the Little Rock Nine
established. King and the civil rights movement employed similar images
combining nonviolent protest and federal litigation to defeat Jim Crow
through the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. This
resistance engendered a new birth of American liberty; it nonetheless proved
vulnerable on the national level to the same political compromises and ex-
pedients at work in Little Rock since the September crisis. From the mid-
1960s to the present, the nation's changing political context altered congres-
sional, presidential, and Supreme Court priorities, which in turn enabled
white flight and inequitable public school funding to dilute the equal-
opportunity principle of Brown L
The Little Rock Nine and their successors at Central High today epi-
tomize a triumph as well as the need for renewed commitment. Little Rock
white moderates' success in complying with Cooper v. Aaron through the
implementation of a minimum desegregation plan in 1959 established the
pattern that persists. Compared to the Jim Crow era the numbers of African
Americans gaining access to greater economic opportunity has grown; com-
pared to the white majority, however, opportunity is still unequal. The white
majority's unwillingness to support educational opportunity, reflected in
white flight, contributes significantly to this inequality. At the same time,
the resources that are available enable limited numbers of minority students
to achieve more economic opportunity than ever before, a course the Little
Rock Nine pioneered. In Little Rock and the nation, the problem thus en-
dures: how to enlarge for the many the opportunity of the few. From the
Revolution, through the Emancipation Proclamation, to Brown and the civil
rights era, social struggle has gradually changed the established constitu-
tional regime. Future change demands continuing struggle. Or, as the poet
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W. H. Auden observed, "the only knowledge that can be true for use is the
knowledge we can live up to. '
45. W. H. AUDEN, THE DYER'S HAND 272 (1968).
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